Nearly $10 Million for Drought Innovation. Follow the Money, the Middlemen and the Businesses Built Around Australian Farmers.
By Bronwyn Holm | Earthfood Conversations
On 16 February 2023, Australia's then Agriculture Minister, Murray Watt, announced a $10 million government initiative to help bring drought-resilience technology to Australian farmers.
The tender closed on 10 March. Twenty-two days. Beanstalk AgTech Pty Ltd subsequently won the contract. Between December 2023 and April 2026, the Commonwealth paid the company $9,898,700, excluding GST.
Four months after the Australian program concluded, Beanstalk announced Monsoon Ventures, a Singapore-based agricultural venture studio supported by Enterprise Singapore and Rabo Foundation. Its initial investment program was valued at S$1.2 million, with plans to build more than 30 ventures over five years.
There is nothing accidental about the commercial sophistication of this model. Beanstalk builds businesses. It assembles researchers, intellectual property, entrepreneurs, advisers and investors, then helps convert technology into commercially viable companies.
The Australian taxpayer financed a substantial chapter of that work.
The question is whether the Australian farmer, whose drought resilience justified the expenditure, has received a proportionate return.
To understand the economics, we need to follow more than the government payment. We need to examine the people who designed the opportunity, the company that won it, the businesses created through it, the intellectual property involved and the commercial relationships that continued after the Australian contract ended.
Welcome to the agricultural circus.
Who Put the $10 Million on the Table?
Murray Watt did not invent the Future Drought Fund. It was established in 2019, before the Albanese Government came to office. (Simply parties of any colour in the same paddock).
The fund already had an extensive administrative and advisory structure, including a statutory Consultative Committee advising on its funding priorities. Its 2021–22 membership included chair Brent Finlay, Dr Kate Andrews, Dr Wendy Craik, Dr Elizabeth Peterson and Caroline Welsh.
By the time Watt announced the commercialisation initiative in February 2023, the government had settled on a particular approach to drought resilience: instead of paying farmers directly or financing the expansion of existing manufacturers, it would pay a delivery organisation to help innovators establish commercially viable businesses.
That required a proposal, departmental assessment, funding approval, a delivery model and tender documentation. Those decisions necessarily preceded the public announcement.
The official announcement identified a $10 million commitment and a tender closing 22 days later. It did not identify the individuals or external organisations responsible for proposing the commercialisation model, the stakeholders consulted beforehand or the number of competing bidders.
The eventual winner, Beanstalk AgTech, was already operating in agricultural innovation and commercialisation. (The Department of Agriculture has been asked, under Freedom of Information, to release the records behind the initiative's creation and procurement and when that is received I will update this article).
The documents sought include the original business case, ministerial briefings, pre-tender consultations, evaluation criteria, competing bid numbers, conflict declarations and contract variations. Those records could establish whether the initiative emerged from internal policy development, advice from external agricultural interests or a combination of both.
At present, the published record does not establish that Beanstalk influenced the tender before bidding. Nor does the 22-day application window, by itself, establish an unfair procurement. But almost $10 million was at stake, and the origins of the commercial opportunity deserve the same attention as its eventual results.
The government announced the money. Beanstalk won the contract. The money was paid. The pre-announcement decision-making trail is the next part of the investigation.
Eleven Payments. $9,898,700.
The Commonwealth's funding disclosure, published under section 27A of the Future Drought Fund Act 2019, identifies Beanstalk AgTech Pty Ltd as the recipient.
The department's payment record contains the following transactions.
| Payment date | Amount, excluding GST |
|---|---|
| 8 December 2023 | $500,000 |
| 31 January 2024 | $1,500,000 |
| 31 March 2024 | $2,000,000 |
| 30 June 2024 | $500,000 |
| 30 January 2025 | $1,250,000 |
| 30 March 2025 | $1,250,000 |
| 14 August 2025 | $750,000 |
| 17 December 2025 | $250,000 |
| 6 February 2026 | $250,000 |
| 12 March 2026 | $250,000 |
| 1 April 2026 | $1,398,700 |
| TOTAL | $9,898,700 |
Source: Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, Future Drought Fund payment disclosure, reporting position at 30 April 2026. Figures exclude GST.
The contract's GST-inclusive equivalent is $10,888,570. That is not an additional payment. It is the same contract amount with GST included. The published disclosure shows that the $9,898,700 had been paid in full, with nothing outstanding. It identifies the company receiving the money, but not the downstream recipients.
There is no corresponding itemised public schedule showing what Beanstalk spent on salaries, administration, consultants, lawyers, subcontractors, specialist services, direct venture assistance or other program expenses.
The contract revenue cannot be mistaken for company profit. Delivering a two-year professional services program involves substantial costs. But identifying the contractor is only the first step in accounting for the public expenditure.
The next step is determining what the contractor actually purchased with it.
What Australia Bought
Beanstalk's Drought Venture Studio operated through two stages: the Drought Resilience Lab and Ventures-in-Residence. The company's reported outcomes include the following.
| Reported outcome | Beanstalk's published figure |
|---|---|
| Innovators supported | 84 |
| Commercialisation plans completed | 80 |
| Professional services through the Drought Resilience Lab | $500,000 |
| Ventures-in-Residence | 8 |
| Commercialisation services for resident ventures | $1.34 million |
| Direct financial support available per resident venture | Up to $250,000 |
| University IP assignments to founding ventures | 4 |
| Resident ventures attracting external investment | 6 of 8 |
Beanstalk has also reported that participating innovators attracted more than A$22 million in investment and launched 15 commercial products and services.
Later promotional material associated with Monsoon Ventures reported more than A$27 million raised, 32 trials or pilots and 23 products and services brought to market. These later figures should be understood in the context of their reporting date and scope.
There are achievements here. New technologies were developed commercially, innovators received professional assistance, and several businesses attracted investment. But the public figures leave substantial questions about the expenditure itself. And there are few details to assess this activity.
The reported $500,000 and $1.34 million represent service values. They are not necessarily direct cash payments to innovators. The $250,000 was the maximum assistance available to each resident venture, not proof that all eight received that amount.
The published figures cannot be added together to reconstruct the contract's expenditure or calculate Beanstalk's profit.
The government paid nearly $10 million for a commercialisation service. Beanstalk has reported the commercialisation work undertaken. A detailed reconciliation of the expenditure, and the resulting on-farm economic benefits, has not been established from the records examined.
More importantly, the reported number of business plans, products and investment rounds tells us very little about what has happened on Australian farms.
A new venture securing capital is an achievement for the venture. It is not, by itself, evidence that a grazier has reduced operating costs, a grain farmer has improved soil moisture, or an orchard has become more resilient during drought. Bronwyn Holm, Founder Earthfood
That requires another set of figures.
Meet the People Behind the Venture Studio
The Australian program was delivered by identifiable business people and commercialisation specialists.
Beanstalk's published team identified Marcus Agnew as Head of Venture Studio, Justin McMurray as Lead Venture Architect, Ben Lever as Senior Venture Builder and Natalie King as Operations Lead.
Other listed contributors included Brett Geoghegan, Anna Tao, Angela Poe Noronha, Deon Goosen, Tom van Gammeren, Klara Kalocsay and James Ryall.
Beanstalk director Calum Archibald was described by the company as a driving force behind the creation of its Drought Venture Studio. He also participated in the venture-selection process.
That selection committee included Dr Angeline Achariya, CEO of Innovation Gamechangers; Leanne Kemp, founder of Everledger; and Paul Levins, co-founder of Xinova.
These names identify the professional and commercial networks involved in choosing and developing the ventures. Their participation in venture selection does not establish involvement in designing the original Commonwealth tender.
The studio's activities included business planning, financial modelling, customer discovery, investor introductions, venture governance, legal assistance, intellectual property negotiations and product development. These are specialised commercial services, supplied through a professional network.
Beanstalk's 2024 reporting described engagement with 37 investors, including investors from Singapore. A pipeline of investment-ready agricultural businesses is commercially useful to founders, investors and industry partners. It can also be valuable to the organisation that develops the relationships and proves its ability to build ventures.
That value is not confined to the contract's closing date. Beanstalk's own FAQ stated that the government-funded studio did not take equity in participating ventures. Its assistance was described as non-dilutive.
The significance is that the Australian studio operated as a funded service model, rather than simply acquiring a shareholding in every company it developed.
The financial returns available to Beanstalk through the Australian contract were therefore different from the ownership rights that might arise through later private investments or other business activities.
The public payment record does not disclose the remuneration of individual team members, their contracting arrangements or their financial interests in separate businesses.
It would be wrong to treat the government contract as personal income to the named individuals. The economic structure remains worth examining because a commercialisation company can earn revenue from delivering professional services and retain the experience, operating methods and relationships developed along the way.
The University Pipeline: Research Becomes Private Business
The Drought Venture Studio reported four university intellectual property assignments to founding ventures.
Beanstalk's published material identifies innovators associated with research organisations including the University of Queensland, University of Tasmania, James Cook University, CSIRO and the Cooperative Research Centre for High Performance Soils.
One early participant was Dr Munir Sadiq of CSIRO, associated with atmospheric water-generation technology, (Note to readers: I was involved in the University of PERU on the same topic 25 years ago but they took tech to make it theirs under different names and similar processes) . Another was Lachlan Vogt of AIgorithm, whose work involved the use of soil and vegetation data for agricultural analysis.
The broader model is straightforward.
Research institutions develop technology, often with public support. Intellectual property is established and held by the relevant institution or commercial owner. A venture-building program helps researchers create businesses, negotiate licensing or assignments, develop financial models and seek private investment.
The technology can then move into a company with its own founders, directors, shareholders and commercial objectives.
Each transaction potentially creates ownership rights, future royalties, investment returns or licensing income.
Beanstalk reported four university IP assignments. The published program summary does not identify the complete commercial terms of each transfer.
Those agreements would establish which research institutions transferred the assets, what rights they retained, which ventures acquired them and whether future payments or ownership interests were involved. There is no reason to presume those arrangements were improper. :)
But where publicly supported research contributes to privately owned businesses, ownership and financial terms form part of the public-value story.
A taxpayer-funded research result may eventually become a commercial product sold to farmers. The economic benefits may be distributed among research institutions, founders, employees, investors and licence holders before the product reaches the market.
The farmer ultimately pays whatever commercial price is charged. The complete ownership trail determines who benefits from those payments.
Too Commercial for Commercialisation?
Among the most revealing documents in this investigation is Beanstalk's own application guidance.
The Drought Venture Studio sought early-stage technology, novel and defensible intellectual property, prototypes and ventures requiring support to develop viable business models.
Its FAQ indicated that technologies already commercialised through earlier programs, with businesses onboarding customers or securing investment, were not the intended fit. That is consistent with a program designed to create new ventures.
It also exposes a peculiar imbalance in agricultural innovation financing.
An innovator with early-stage research and an undeveloped business could potentially receive assistance through a multimillion-dollar government-financed venture-building program.
A manufacturer that had already spent decades developing even a better technology, established production, obtained certifications and built commercial customers would require a different financing pathway, it seems.
For that manufacturer, the challenge might no longer be proving the basic concept. It might be building another production facility, acquiring equipment, financing stock, expanding distribution, employing staff or securing access to international markets.
Those activities are expensive, and many established small businesses struggle to finance them. Australia has manufacturing, export and commercial investment mechanisms, but their eligibility, security requirements and commercial terms are not interchangeable with early-stage venture support.
The result is a funding landscape with highly organised pathways for developing some new agricultural businesses, while established independent manufacturers may remain unable to obtain the capital necessary to expand.
I know this position personally.
Singapore: The Business Continues
On 11 August 2026, Beanstalk announced the launch of Monsoon Ventures, headquartered in Singapore.
The announcement identified support from Enterprise Singapore and Rabo Foundation, with an initial S$1.2 million investment program.
The stated plan was to develop eight ventures in the first two years and more than 30 over five years, targeting agricultural technology opportunities in Southeast Asia.
Monsoon identifies itself as a wholly owned subsidiary of Beanstalk.
Its published team includes directors Justin Ahmed and William Taing, with Justin McMurray as Lead Venture Architect, Anna Tao as Senior Venture Builder and Klara Kalocsay in marketing communications.
The overlap with the Australian venture-building operation is visible.
Beanstalk's international announcement linked the Singapore development to the company's Australian venture-studio experience and commercialisation track record.
Justin Ahmed publicly connected Monsoon's launch to the achievements of the Drought Venture Studio. William Taing also described the Singapore expansion as building on Beanstalk's Australian venture-building experience.
The international partners were named.
Sharon Tay, a director at Enterprise Singapore with responsibilities covering food manufacturing and agri-technology, spoke about Singapore's role in regional technology commercialisation.
Bram Spann, Rabo Foundation's regional lead for Asia, described its interest in combining capital, expertise and partnerships to develop stronger agricultural ventures.
Monsoon's financing approach involves philanthropic, public and private capital.
Beanstalk identifies itself as an investor. Enterprise Singapore provides foundational support, while Rabo Foundation provides catalytic capital.
The company has established an international commercial vehicle capable of assembling different funding sources around venture development.
Beanstalk had conducted business in Southeast Asia before completing the Australian program, so the Singapore expansion cannot be attributed solely to that contract. Nor do the public records examined prove that funds paid under the Australian Drought Venture Studio contract were transferred to Monsoon.
The relevant economic relationship is broader.
The Australian Government funded Beanstalk to deliver commercialisation services. Those services contributed to the company's publicly promoted track record in venture development. The company subsequently established a wholly owned international studio, with external institutional support and itself participating as an investor.
The amount Beanstalk invested in Monsoon, the investment terms, the commercial rights held through the subsidiary and any shared assets or related-party arrangements are not established in the public material examined.
The value of commercial expertise is not confined to money sitting in a bank account.
Operating systems, client relationships, industry knowledge, venture-building experience and a demonstrated record of delivering substantial programs can all support further commercial opportunities.
The extent of that value and its financial ownership would require the relevant corporate, investment and accounting records.
Rabo Foundation and Rabobank's commercial banking operations must also be distinguished. Their institutional relationship does not make every transaction undertaken by one a transaction undertaken by the other.
But the Rabo connection is a useful reminder that agricultural finance can involve banks, foundations, venture capital, corporate development and government-funded programs operating in overlapping markets.
The complete financial picture requires examining the actual entities and transactions, rather than stopping at the name of the first recipient.
The Layered Cake: An Industry Around the Farmer
The Beanstalk example opens a wider investigation into how agricultural funding systems operate.
A problem is identified. Drought, soil decline, water shortages or the rising cost of production becomes the subject of a government initiative.
Funding is allocated. A program operator is selected. The operator assembles advisers, researchers, universities and commercial specialists. New ventures are developed, intellectual property is transferred or licensed, and investors are introduced.
The people and organisations involved may subsequently participate in other programs, advisory bodies, investment vehicles, alliances or international businesses.
Every layer can have a separate financial function.
| Layer | Organisations and participants | Financial or commercial interest |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Government funding | Future Drought Fund, Commonwealth departments | Grants, contracts and procurement |
| 2. Policy and program design | Departments, advisory committees, industry consultations | Influence over program structure and funding priorities |
| 3. Delivery organisations | Beanstalk AgTech and other operators | Contract revenue, operating expertise and commercial reputation |
| 4. Professional advisers | Consultants, accountants, lawyers, venture builders, marketing and technical specialists | Salaries, consulting fees and service contracts |
| 5. Research institutions | CSIRO, universities, research centres | Research funding, IP assignments, licences and potential equity interests |
| 6. Alliances and councils | Grower alliances, regional councils, industry associations and delivery partnerships | Grants, program administration, project contracts and service income |
| 7. Foundations and trusts | Philanthropic foundations, grantmaking trusts and asset-holding entities | Donations, investment income, grants, sponsorship and project funding |
| 8. Financial institutions and investors | Banks, investment funds, venture capital organisations | Lending, equity, financial services and future commercial returns |
| 9. International entities | Subsidiaries, overseas venture studios and holding companies | New funding, investments, commercial activity and ownership interests |
| 10. The farmer | Australian growers, graziers and producers | Access to technology, improved production and potentially lower operating costs |
This is a map of possible financial relationships, not an allegation that every organisation receives money from every other layer.
An alliance may not even be a separate legal entity. Several organisations can collaborate through agreements, with one acting as the funding recipient and others providing contracted services.
A council may receive a program grant and contract specialist providers. A university may lead a regional hub while paying delivery partners. A foundation may finance projects through donations and investment income. A commercial manufacturer may supply goods or services under contract.
Companies and trusts may hold land, intellectual property or operating assets separately from the organisations delivering programs.
These structures are widely used for legitimate reasons, including financing, governance, asset protection, program delivery and continuity.
They also mean that following one government payment is insufficient to identify every subsequent economic beneficiary.
Money can move through management fees, service contracts, related-party payments, loans, licensing arrangements and investments. Commercial value can also arise without a direct transfer of the original government funds.
The appropriate investigation therefore follows ownership, control, contracts, assets and revenue, as well as bank payments.
The public can readily see a funding announcement and often the first recipient. It can be considerably harder to trace the entire commercial structure built around the expenditure.
And the farmer can remain the stated beneficiary without receiving any ownership interest in the infrastructure, intellectual property or businesses developed along the way.
Another $86.7 Million for Drought Hubs
The Drought Venture Studio is not the only example of public agricultural funding operating through institutional delivery networks.
In May 2026, Agriculture Minister Julie Collins announced a new grant opportunity worth up to $86.7 million for seven Future Drought Fund Drought Resilience Hubs, with funding extending to June 2032.
Applications for the refreshed program closed on 10 August 2026.
The previous network contained eight hubs. Seven were led by regional universities and one by a grower group alliance.
The Grower Group Alliance led the South-West Western Australian Drought Resilience Hub.
The Southern NSW hub was hosted by Charles Sturt University through a collaborative arrangement involving other institutions and regional partners.
These models demonstrate the importance of universities, alliances and institutional networks in accessing and delivering public agricultural programs. They can coordinate substantial regional expertise and bring research, training and practical demonstrations to farmers - that is plan and yet very tightly demonstrated.
They can also create another chain of funding recipients, subcontractors, specialist providers and administrative expenditure.
The Commonwealth's initial investment in the hub network was $66 million over four years. The refreshed $86.7 million opportunity represents a further substantial commitment.
The contracts and grant agreements determine who receives the funds, what services must be delivered, how costs are allocated and what results must be reported.
Those arrangements deserve examination in the same way as the Beanstalk contract.
Across the broader Future Drought Fund, the Albanese Government announced $519.1 million over eight years in May 2024 for the fund's next phase.
There is no shortage of money flowing into organised drought-resilience initiatives.
The unresolved issue is how consistently that expenditure can be linked to measurable benefits for farmers and farming communities.
The Productivity Commission Had Already Raised the Alarm About Measurement
In September 2023, the Productivity Commission released its review of the Future Drought Fund.
The Commission was broadly supportive of the fund's objectives and recognised the importance of preparing agriculture and regional communities for drought.
But it identified weaknesses in program design, coordination, knowledge sharing, monitoring and evaluation.
Its review examined the difficulty of establishing whether funded activities produced the intended long-term resilience outcomes.
Reporting on funding allocated, projects delivered, participants engaged and programs completed is relatively straightforward.
Demonstrating that those activities actually improved a farm's resilience, financial position or operating capability is more difficult.
The Commission recommended improvements to evaluation systems and stronger evidence of economic, environmental and social outcomes.
The challenge was known while the Drought Venture Studio was still operating.
By the time Beanstalk's contract concluded in April 2026, the company could report new ventures, commercialisation plans, investment attracted, services delivered and products launched. Those figures should form part of the evaluation.
But the ultimate purpose of the expenditure was drought resilience, not simply the establishment of more agricultural technology companies.
That requires evidence from agricultural use: adoption, operating costs, productivity, soil and water outcomes, farm-business performance and resilience under relevant conditions.
It also requires a reasonable account of how the program contributed to those results, rather than attributing every subsequent investment or commercial success to the original government contract.
Earthfood: The Technology Exists. The Expansion Capital Does Not.
At Earthfood, and behind its' research and development company in the USA in the past spent decades working with microbial soil technology and building the now branded Earthfood as an Australian commercial enterprise.
The technology has a commercial history extending more than 40 years. The researched work includes independently controlled intellectual property, a substantial certification and standards portfolio, manufacturing knowledge and commercial agricultural applications along with farm problem solving and yielded results as reported in every case.
Earthfood's stated production capability is approximately one million litres per week, with the potential to increase through infrastructure investment and additional manufacturing facilities, including international production arrangements.
We need capital to expand Australian manufacturing, improve facilities, establish more independent commercial demonstrations, build distribution and take the technology into international markets. The current distribution is currently sending to some states in USA, Philippines, PNG, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Panama, and soon New Zealand and the UK. We have proven our worth.
We are not seeking funding for somebody to invent our existing product.
The business has consumed substantial personal investment and I am now approaching retirement.
Without a financially sustainable structure, new investment and a practical succession plan, Earthfood may eventually close. That is a real possibility. And yet we have saved farmers' lives, land and businesses and proven records and rigorous trialling.
Meanwhile, Australia continues to finance programs intended to develop and commercialise agricultural technology. I do not claim that Earthfood was entitled to Beanstalk's contract or that its program was designed to fund businesses like mine.
It clearly favoured early-stage venture creation, most likely a post grad student from one of those Universities as I have seen countless of times with no skill in business and and no skin in the game.
My concern is the wider allocation of investment and the commercial pathways available to established independent manufacturers. As part of a bigger play for us there has decades spent developing technology and manufacturing capability. What remains missing is the scale of capital required to expand production and market access.
Large agricultural suppliers can spend substantial sums on brand awareness, national distribution, sales teams and commercial relationships. And for us that would be $2m in Australia JUST ON BRANDING to rise above the microbial wallpaper of nonsense.
An independent manufacturer can possess its own technology and still struggle to reach the farmers who might benefit from it. Technical achievement does not automatically produce access to capital or markets.
And that has been one of the most expensive lessons of my working life from natural history to seed in the ground.
I have now spent years concentrating on the science, the manufacturing backup for all occasions, the presentations and documents, the research for every phone call from a distressed farmer and the beginner-customer.
The agricultural commercialisation industry concentrated on the structures surrounding innovation: the programs, partners, professional services, investors, intellectual property arrangements and new businesses.
There is almost a dark humour in discovering that I may have spent too much time on the land with a farmer or gardener and not enough time developing the institutional machinery around it. But the lesson is useful.
Earthfood's future may depend on building a more durable structure involving the bigger markets for more manufacturing, independently governed project delivery, training, land restoration, commercial partnerships and income-producing infrastructure. The ability to obtain capital and deliver funded work need not depend entirely on the founder remaining personally responsible for every transaction.
A business intended to survive its founder requires assets, management, recurring income and governance capable of continuing when the founder steps away.
The agricultural layered cake has given me an education in how established organisations assemble those capabilities. I intend to use that knowledge.
Put the Farmer Back Into the Accounts
Nearly $10 million has been paid, the Commonwealth contract is complete, and Beanstalk has reported its commercialisation achievements.
The public record examined for this investigation does not yet provide a complete expenditure reconciliation or independently verified account of the resulting benefits on Australian farms.
Beanstalk counts innovators, business plans, investment raised and products brought to market.
What remains to be established is the farmer's balance sheet: the number of farms using the technologies, the actual costs of adoption, the savings achieved, the improvements in productivity and soil or water performance, and the degree of resilience demonstrated during drought.
The financial accounting requires equal attention. The Commonwealth has disclosed its payments to Beanstalk, but the documents examined do not provide a comprehensive breakdown of administration, professional services, subcontractors and direct financial assistance.
Four university intellectual property assignments have been reported without the complete commercial terms appearing in the public program summary.
The subsequent Singapore venture has published its shareholders' corporate relationship and named funding supporters, but not the full investment arrangements or commercial rights associated with those relationships.
The Department of Agriculture has indicated that an external evaluation will assess the Australian initiative. That report should distinguish the delivery of commercialisation services from evidence of improved agricultural outcomes.
The Department holds the procurement and program-oversight records. Beanstalk holds the operational and financial records of its delivery work. The research institutions and ventures hold the relevant intellectual property agreements. The participants in Monsoon Ventures can account for their own investment and governance arrangements.
The public deserves a coherent account of the money, ownership and results, within the proper boundaries of commercially confidential information.
Some of those records may provide convincing evidence of strong outcomes. Others may reveal shortcomings in the original program design or its evaluation. The important point is that the claims should be tested against documents and demonstrable results.
Australia has become very proficient at announcing agricultural innovation. Its departments, universities, advisers, alliances, foundations and venture studios operate within an extensive system of public and private finance. Many people earn their living working within it.
The farmer, however, lives with the practical consequences of the agricultural economy every day.
A consultant can complete a report. An administrator can meet a contractual milestone. A university can license intellectual property. A venture studio can announce another investment round. The farmer must still produce something and sell it for enough money to survive. THAT IS THE MISERY IN ALL THIS.
The taxpayer has paid the bill. The commercialisation industry has recorded its achievements. The farmer is entitled to see the return.
Before Australia allocates another $10 million to developing agricultural innovation, it should publish a proper account of what the previous $10 million delivered.
Follow the original proposal. Follow the tender. Follow the payments. Follow the consultants, alliances, foundations and universities. Follow the intellectual property, investors and international companies.
Then follow the results back to the farm. Because farmers cannot pay their bills with innovation announcements.
Sources and Documents
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Australian Government, Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry: Future Drought Fund: Funding Information, Drought Resilience Commercialisation Initiative. Official payment disclosure under section 27A of the Future Drought Fund Act 2019, reporting position at 30 April 2026.
https://www.agriculture.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/funding-information-drought-resilience-commercialisation-initiative.pdf -
Senator Murray Watt, Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry: Backing New Drought Resilience Projects, 16 February 2023. Announcement of the $10 million initiative, original mid-2025 timetable and 10 March 2023 tender deadline.
https://minister.agriculture.gov.au/watt/media-releases/backing-new-drought-resilience-projects -
Beanstalk AgTech: Drought Venture Studio, The Program. Reported outcomes, commercialisation services, resident ventures and intellectual property assignments.
https://ventures.beanstalkagtech.com/droughtresiliencelab -
Beanstalk AgTech: Drought Venture Studio, FAQs. Application criteria, early-stage requirements, IP arrangements and non-dilutive support.
https://ventures.beanstalkagtech.com/faqs -
Beanstalk AgTech: Beanstalk AgTech Announces the Launch of Monsoon Ventures, 11 August 2026. Singapore expansion, funding partners and named representatives.
https://www.beanstalkagtech.com/blog/beanstalk-agtech-announces-the-launch-of-monsoon-ventures -
Monsoon Ventures: About Monsoon Ventures. Corporate ownership, venture team and funding structure.
https://www.monsoon-ventures.com/about -
Productivity Commission: Future Drought Fund, Inquiry Report, released 26 September 2023. Review of funding design, delivery, monitoring and evaluation.
https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries-and-research/future-drought-fund/report/ -
Productivity Commission: Future Drought Fund Submissions Register. Includes the Future Drought Fund Consultative Committee's submission received 30 November 2022.
https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries-and-research/future-drought-fund/submissions/ -
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry: Drought Resilience Adoption and Innovation Hubs. Original eight-hub structure and refreshed $86.7 million funding opportunity.
https://www.agriculture.gov.au/agriculture-land/farm-food-drought/drought/future-drought-fund/research-adoption-program/adoption-innovation-hubs
Investigation status, October 2026: A Freedom of Information request has been prepared to obtain records concerning the initiative's original proposal, pre-tender consultations, procurement assessment, contract and evaluation arrangements. Any subsequent findings will be incorporated into an updated investigation.
Bronwyn Holm, Founder, Earthfood®
Farmers' Friend • Gardeners' Guide • Soil Advocate • Growers' Voice
© 2026 Bronwyn Holm. All rights reserved.
Earthfood® • Earthfood Pantry™ • Earthfood Conversations™
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Productivity Commission Notes:
Beanstalk's published team identifies Marcus Agnew as Head of Venture Studio, Justin McMurray as Lead Venture Architect, Ben Lever as Senior Venture Builder and Natalie King as Operations Lead.
The wider venture-building team included Brett Geoghegan, Anna Tao, Angela Poe Noronha, Deon Goosen, Tom van Gammeren, Klara Kalocsay and James Ryall.
Those names identify the professional people involved in delivering the program. The public payment record does not establish their individual remuneration, employment arrangements or personal financial interests.
Beanstalk's commercial services included customer discovery, financial modelling, intellectual property advice, venture governance, product development and introductions to investors.
Investors were part of the model. So were founders, universities, technical specialists and professional advisers.
The company was building an investment-ready agricultural business pipeline with support from a substantial public contract.
Interestingly, Beanstalk's own application guidance said the Australian Government-funded Drought Venture Studio would not take equity in the new ventures. The support was non-dilutive.
That makes the financial question more precise.
The Commonwealth funded a professional venture-building service. The participating founders could retain ownership while obtaining services and investment support. Beanstalk received contract revenue and developed commercial expertise and relationships.
Who supplied the professional services, how much did each component cost, and what commercial benefits continued after the government contract finished?
The publicly available payment schedule cannot answer those questions.
Shop living soil microbes at yourearthfood.com.au